

Message Text

PAGE 01 MAPUTO 00265 171431Z

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4383

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY GABONRONE

AMEMBASSY MBABANE

AMEMBASSY MASERU

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAPUTO 0265

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, RH, MZ

SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REF: STATE 62613

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY CONCURS WITH REFTEL TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH CHISSANO. WE BELIEVE CHANCES OF RESTRICTING CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA AND MOZAMBIQUE WILL BE DIMINISHED IF USG DOES NOT JOIN IN HELPING MOZAMBIQUE OFFSET COST OF ENFORCING SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, EMBASSY FEELS THAT DEPT SHOULD BE AWARE OF FOLLOWING BUILT-IN PROBLEMS IN TALKS WITH CHISSANO.
--DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND CONTROL OF GPRM MIGHT WELL TRIGGER CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA
--ANY USG ASSISTANCE TO GPRM FACES POTENTIAL DOMESTIC CRITICISM SO
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PAGE 02 MAPUTO 00265 171431Z

LONG AS US MISSIONARIES ARE DETAINED.

--GPRM IS INORDINATELY SENSITIVE AND HOSTILE TO POSSIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN AID AND POLITICAL DEMANDS.

--GPRM AID EXPECTATIONS FROM US WILL BE HIGH.

END SUMMARY

2. TENUOUSNESS OF ANY GPRM UNDERSTANDING TO RESTRICT CUBAN ACTIVITY:

WE BELIEVE THAT AS CHISSANO INDICATED TO CHARGE AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR, GPRM GENUINELY HOPES MAJORITY RULE CAN BE ATTAINED IN RHODESIA WITHOUT RECOURSE TO CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OR SOVIET AND /OR

CHINESE INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, GPRM COULD CHANGE ITS MIND UNDER FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES.

A. RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE: PRESIDENT SAMORA MACHEL HAS PUBLICLY WARNED THE SMITH REGIME THAT IF IT CONTINUES TO VIOLATE MOZAMBIKAN TERRITORY, HE WOULD SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM HIS SOCIALIST ALLIES AND AFRICAN BROTHERS TO HELP DEFEND HIS BORDERS AND TO ELIMINATE THE RHODESIAN THREAT. MACHEL'S WORDS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY. IF THE SMITH REGIME SHOULD STEP UP ITS CRSS BORDER OPERATIONS OR INFLICT SERIOUS DAMAGE ON A MAJOR MOZAMBIKAN ECONOMIC TARGET OG TOWN, THIS WOULD ALMTST CERTAINLY PROMPT SOME FRELIMO LEADERS TO ARGUE FOR CUBAN INTERVENTION.

B. SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MILITARY ASISTANCE TO RHODESIA: MOZAMBIQUE IS LIKELY TO TOLERATE CONTINUED INDIRECT SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SMITH REGIME. HOWEVER, IF SOUTH AFRICAN SHOULD REINTRODUCE ITS POLICE UNITS OR SEND COMBAT SOLDIERS INTO RHODESIA UNDER ANY PRETEXT, THIS TOO WOULD VERY LIKELY LEAD TO A REQUEST FOR HAVAN'S ASSISTANCE.

C. ANC GUERRILLAS SET-BACKS: ANC GUERRILLA UNITS ARE RELATIVELY SMALL IN NUMBER AND POORLY TRAINED. THEIR ABILITY TO STAND UP ON THEIR OWN AGAINST THE RHODESIANS IS STILL UNCERTAIN. IF THESE ANC GUERRILLAS ARE ROUTED OR SEEM TO BE TAKING HEAVY PUNISHMENT, IT IS PROBABLE THAT A LIFE-SAVING REACTION WILL BE SET IN MOTION; POSSIBLY WITH THE INTERVENTION OF CUBAN OR MOZAMBIQUE COMBAT PERSONNEL.

D. INADEQUATE COMPENSATION OFFSET: IF ECONOMIC OFFSET DOES NOT MEET GPRM EXPECTATIONS OR CURRENT ECONOMIC DOWNTURN IS NOT CHECKED, GPRM MIGHT SERIOUSLY CONSIDER ACCELERATING ARMED STRUGGLE IN HOPES OF BRINGING SWIFT END TO ITS OWN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OR OF DEFLECTING RISING DOMESTIC CRITICISM AND UNREST CAUSED BY ECONOMIC AUSTERITY.

E. SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE ANC OR GUERRILLA LEADERS: CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MAPUTO 00265 171431Z

MOZAMBIQUE'S LEADERS HAVE STATED THAT THE CURRENT SMITH-NKOMO TALKS ARE FUTILE AND FEEL THAT MAJORITY RULE WILL ONLY BE WON THROUGH ARMED CONFLICT. ACCORDINGLY, THEY HAVE THROWN THEIR FULL SUPPORT BEHIND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "THIRD FORCE," WHICH COM- PRISES THE MILITARY UNITS FIGHTING IN RHODESIA OR TRAINING IN MOZAMBIQUE. IF THE BRITISH WERE TO AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN NKOMO AND SMITH THAT DELAYED MAJORITY AFRICAN RULE FOR OVER A YEAR OR THAT DID NOT INCLUDE THE GUERRILLAS AND THE EXTERNAL WING OF THE ANC, IT WOULD NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MOZAMBIQUE AND A LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER RADICAL AFRICAN STATES. THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER ANGOLA IN RHODESIA, WITH AFRICANS FIGHTING AGAINST AFRICANS, AND MOZAMBIQUE AND CUBA ASSISTING THE "MORE PROGRESSIVE" ANC GUERRILLA FORCES, WOULD BECOME A FRIGHTENING REALITY.

3. US PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSIDERATIONS: ANY USG ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE, FOR WHATEVER REASON, IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO ELICIT SHARP CRITICISM FROM CHURCH GROUPS WHICH HAVE MISSIONARIES IN DETENTION IN MOZAMBIQUE. THE CHURCH OF THE NAZARENE, FOR WHICH TWO OF THE THREE DETAINED MISSIONARIES SERVED, AND THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THE MISSIONARIES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED AT OUR AND THEIR INABILITY TO OBTAIN ANY RESULTS FROM NUMEROUS REPRESENTATIONS.

ON MARCH 15 THE AMBASSADOR RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MR. JERALD JOHNSON EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, WORLD MISSIONS, OF THE CHURCH OF THE NAZARENES WHO WANTED THE AMBASSADOR'S OPINION WHETHER THE CHURCH SHOULD FLOOD FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO WITH TELEGRAMS AND MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF THE DETENTIONS DURING THE CURRENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL SESSIONS. ALTHOUGH THE AMBASSADOR HAS CAUTIONED MR. JOHNSON AGAINST SUCH A CAMPAIGN, ARGUING THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY DAMAGE THE CHANCES OF THE MISSIONARIES RELEASE, WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OUR WARNING WILL DETER MR. JOHNSON OR THE CHURCH. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHURCH IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO CRITICIZE THE USG SHARPLY FOR OFFERING AID TO MOZAMBIQUE IF AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT RAISE THE MATTER OF THE MISSIONARIES AND OBTAIN SOME ASSURANCE THAT THEIR CASES WILL BE EXPEDITIOUSLY HANDLED.

AS THE DEPT IS AWARE, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THE MISSIONARIES.

4. GPRM SENSITIVITIES: CHISSANO HAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED GPRM HOSTILITY TO CONDITIONS OR CONCESSIONS LINKED TO AID. AT THE SOVIET NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATION HERE LAST YEAR HE PUBLICLY CAUTIONED THE USSR NOT TO CONCLUDE THAT BECAUSE THE USSR HAD AIDED FRELIMO

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PAGE 04 MAPUTO 00265 171431Z

PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE THAT THE GPRM WOULD NECESSARILY CARRY OUT THE USSR'S BIDDING. GPRM HAS EVEN OBJECTED TO APPROVED UNDP AND FAO PROGRAMS BECAUSE THEY CALLED FOR SOME FORM OF FOREIGN SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD. THE GPRM SEEMS TO BE DETERMINED TO REJECT AID OFFERS THAT HAVE STRINGS ATTACHED.

WERE THE GPRM TO CONCLUDE THAT OUR AID OFFER WAS ADVANCED BY US PRIMARILY TO RESTRICT CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF OUR DESIRE TO JOIN IN A COLLECTIVE EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA, CHISSANO MIGHT WELL REJECT IT. SINCE GPRM IS ALREADY PREDISPOSED TO QUESTION USG MOTIVES, LINKAGE OF US AID TO CUBANS WILL BE A PARTICULARLY DELICATE MATTER TO HANDLE WITH CHISSANO. FOR TALKS TO GO WELL, POINT WE MUST MAKE IS THAT USG IS OFFERING AID BECAUSE WE TRULY WISH TO SEE AN END TO MINORITY RULE IN RHODESIA.

TO RAISE THE MISSIONARY MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF US AID TO THE GPRM WILL LIKEWISE BE TRICKY. EMBASSY FEARS THAT IF GPRM CONCLUDES THAT WE TRYING TO USE AID TO EFFECT THEIR RELEASE, WE MAY GIVE THE GPRM CAUSE TO BE EVEN MORE OBSTINATE ON THIS ISSUE. AT SAME TIME, OWING TO GROWING CHURCH PRESSURE FOR ACTION IN REFERENCE TO THE MISSIONARIES, BELIEVE SCHAUFLE SHOULD RAISE MATTER WITH CHISSANO, ALTHOUGH WE ARE HARD PUT TO RECOMMEND HOW ISSUE SHOULD BE HANDLED. ONE WAY MIGHT BE TO NOTE TO CHISSANO THAT

PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN MATTER IS GROWING, THAT BE-
CAUSE OF THIS INTEREST ANY US AID TO GPRM IS BOUND TO DRAW
CRITICISM IN THE PRESS AND IN THE CONGRESS, AND THAT EFFORTS ON
PART OF FRIENDS OF MOZAMBIQUE TO SUSTAIN SUPPORT FOR THE GPRM WILL
BE DIFFICULT IF SOME ACTION IS NOT FORTHCOMING SHORTLY ON THE
MISSIONARIES.

5. GPRM'S AID EXPECTATIONS: DEPT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DESPITE
LACK OF RESPONSE ON PART OF GPRM TO PREVIOUS US AID OFFERS, GPRM
EXPECTATIONS OF US ASSISTANCE MAY BE RATHER HIGH. FRELIMO LEADER-
SHIP IS CONVINCED THAT US, ANY WORLD'S WEALTHIEST NATION, CAN
EASILY PROVIDE SIZEABLE AID TO MOZAMBIQUE IF IT WANTS TO DO SO.
AT MINIMUM, OUR ASSISTANCE TO ANY COLLECTIVE EFFORT TO HELP OFF-
SET COST OF SANCTIONS WILL BE JUDGED IN COMPARISON TO ASSISTANCE
OFFERED FROM OTHER SOURCES, WHETHER OFFERS ARE LINKED DIRECTLY
TO OFFSET COMPENSATION OR PROVIDED AS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.

OFFERS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ARE ALREADY SIZEABLE.
COUNTING SWEDEN'S RECENT OFFER OF \$46.6 MILLION OVER A THREE YEAR
PERIOD, AID OFFERS NOW TOTAL ABOUT \$200 MILLION. EMBASSY DOES NOT
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PAGE 05 MAPUTO 00265 171431Z

WISH TO SUGGEST THAT USG SHOULD COMPETE WITH SWEDEN. NONETHELESS,
GPRM IS LIKELY TO FEEL THEY ARE BEING LET DOWN IF WE INDICATE TO
GPRM OUR INTENTION TO BE HELPFUL AND SUBSEQUENTLY OFFER AID IN
AMOUNTS LESS THAN THAT RECEIVED FROM COUNTRIES SUCH AS DENMARK
AND THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH HAVE EXTENDED AID IN THE AMOUNTS OF
\$4.8 AND \$10.5 MILLION RESPECTIVELY.

GPRM ALSO LIKELY TO BE IRRITATED IF US AID IS NOT PROMPT OR IS
ENCUMBERED WITH A LOT OF RED TAPE. IF SUCH IS THE CASE, WE WILL
O
BE ACCUSED OF DRAGGING OUR FEET. IF THE POINT HAS NOT BEEN MADE
ALREADY, WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT GPRM WILL BE A VERY
SUSPICIOUS AND DIFFICULT GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH ON ANY AID
MATTERS.

IN LIGHT OF THESE OBSERVATIONS, THE EMBASSY WOULD SUGGEST THAT
IF THE DEPT DECIDES TO CONTRIBUTE OFFSET ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE
THAT IT CONSIDER DOING SO IN THE FORM OF AN OUTRIGHT CONTRIBUTION
TO A COLLECTIVE UN OFFSET FUND OR, IF BILATERALLY, THAT WE
COMMENCE OUR BILATERAL AID PROGRAM WITH A SHIPMENT OF FOOD, PREFERABLY
AS GRANT-IN-AID, IF LEGISLATION AND FUNDS PERMIT. AN OFFER OF
30 THOUSANDS TONS OF CORN, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT BE WELL RECEIVED
SINCE IT WOULD MAKE-UP FOR A LOSS OF 30 THOUSAND TONS OF MAIZE ON
ORDER FROM RHODESIA AT TIME OF BORDER CLOSING.
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